Port Hills’ fires Operational Review 2025

Feb 13, 2025 | News and Updates, Banks Peninsula, Climate Change, Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ), Natural Disasters

Here is the summarized format of the Port Hills’ fires operational review FYI. Full report can be found here. RNZ report can be found here.

1. Purpose of the Review

The Fire and Emergency New Zealand (FENZ) Operational Assurance Team conducted a review of the response to the Port Hills fire on 14 February 2024. The primary goal was to identify key lessons and opportunities for continuous improvement within FENZ, focusing on knowledge sharing and learning from real-world incidents. The review is factual, avoiding conjecture, and aimed at informing senior management about areas needing positive actions, improvements, or corrective measures. The review also highlights what worked well. As stated in the document: “A Review examines Fire and Emergency’s response to an incident to enable continuous improvement and is completed by a Review Team… Whilst a Review considers the application of Fire and Emergency policy, procedures, and relevant operational instructions, the primary focus is to share knowledge, learning and experiences with Officers and Firefighters.”

2. Executive Summary

A vegetation fire started near Worsleys Road, Christchurch, on 14 February 2024. The fire occurred during a period of heightened fire risk and was in the same general location as the destructive 2017 Port Hills fire. The review identifies opportunities for improvement in several key areas, including:

  • Early establishment of a well-resourced Incident Management Team (IMT) at a suitable location.
  • Appointment of experienced and knowledgeable safety officers and safety advisors.
  • Enhanced resourcing and communication links for the Mobile Community Hub.
  • Improved resource management and minimal contact to Communications Centres during fast-evolving incidents.
  • Rapid deployment of Public Information Managers (PIM) based on predetermined criteria.

3. Background & Context

  • Lessons Learned from 2017: FENZ, partner agencies, and the community applied lessons learned from the 2017 Port Hills fire, particularly in community preparedness, inter-agency planning, and public communication.
  • Fuel vs. Wind: While located in the same area as the 2017 fire, the 2024 fire differed significantly. The 2017 fire was primarily fuel-driven, while the 2024 fire was wind-driven, with a change in the predominant fuel type (cutover and young pine and scrub, with accumulations of slash rather than desiccated gorse). As the document notes: “The 2017 Port Hills fire was fuel driven while the fire in 2024 was wind driven and with less fuel available.”
  • Proactive Measures: As 14 February was already recorded as a ‘hot fire day’ there was a helicopter on standby and considerable advice had been given to the public. There was also considerable proactive work done in partnership with key agencies, including Christchurch and Selwyn Territorial Authorities, Police, Civil Defence Emergency Management, local Iwi, and the community.

4. The Event

  • Environment: The Port Hills are a range of hills with diverse landscapes, including rocky tussock, native forests, and exotic grasslands. The area has significant geological, environmental, and scenic importance.
  • Fuel Load: A mix of exotic forest (35.7%), exotic grassland (29.9%), gorse/broom (22.8%) and broadleaved hardwood scrub (10.7%) was present. Much of the north-facing grasslands had a grass curing of 80% to 100%.
  • Fire Behaviour: The fire developed rapidly, driven by a combination of weather, topography, and fuels.
  • Weather Conditions: High temperatures, low humidity, and northerly winds contributed to extreme fire danger. The Early Valley RAWS data indicated a high ignition potential, extremely fast rate of spread, difficult control, and extreme fire intensity. The report states that the “ignition potential (Fine Fuel Moisture Code – FFMC) is easy bordering on very easy, that mop-up needs (Drought Code – DC) are difficult and extensive, that the rate of spread will be extremely fast, that the difficulty of control will be difficult and that the fire intensity will be extreme.”
  • Topography: The fire started mid-slope on a north-facing spur and burned uphill, driven by the slope and wind.

5. Chronology and Response (Key Events)

  • 14:13 hrs, 14 February 2024: Initial 111 call received. Wigram 257 (WIGR257) and Christchurch 2111 (CHRI2111) dispatched.
  • Rapid Escalation: Due to “hot fire day” status, multiple calls, and proximity to the 2017 fire location, a 2nd alarm was transmitted.
  • Air Support: A helicopter was requested almost immediately, with further requests escalating to four helicopters after initial size-up.
  • Evacuations: Police requested to support evacuations, and Adventure Park evacuated.
  • Multiple Alarms: The fire was quickly escalated to a 5th alarm.
  • EMA Issued: Emergency message alert issued to evacuate residents in the Worsleys Spur area.
  • District Commander Assumes Command: The District Commander arrived and assumed command, determined to apply lessons learned from the 2017 fire.
  • Overnight Operations: Significant resources deployed overnight to prevent further fire growth.
  • Public Meeting: The first public meeting was held around 2100 hours.
  • 15 February 2024: Aggressive fire attack continued with helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, and ground crews.
  • Structure Loss: One structure built from containers was lost.
  • Containment: The IC was confident the fire was contained on the morning of 16 February.
  • Mop-Up: Fire and Emergency completed mop-up and finished involvement on 13 March.

6. Key Findings and Opportunities for Improvement (The Review – “4Rs” Headings)

  • Reduction:
  • Positive: The Canterbury District and Territorial Authorities were committed to learning lessons from the 2017 fire. Installation of live cameras, regular monitoring of weather and fuel conditions, and community meetings all contributed to risk reduction. A trial of fire-resistant planting sponsored by the local Iwi, Nga Whiti.
  • Fire prevention messaging commenced early in the fire season, focusing on defendable spaces, and types of planting on properties.

  • Readiness:
  • Positive: The district team was operationally ready due to previous wildfires in Canterbury.
  • Mobile Community Hub: The district had developed a large trailer as a mobile community hub to assist with risk reduction messaging in Canterbury.
  • Improvement: Communication between the IMT and the Community Hub needs to be strengthened, potentially by locating a PIM at the hub. As the document states: “However, some information residents wanted was not readily available at the hub. This appears to be because there was not a close enough communication link between the IMT, and the hub.”

  • Response:
  • Communications Centre (SouthCom):
  • Positive: Early activation of resources, good communication with the on-call Commander and command unit, and engagement with the national media team were positive actions.
  • Improvement: Ensure the Communications Centre isn’t overloaded with logistical requests and message passing. “ComCens can be dealing with multiple requests from the incident ground in the early stages of an incident, while simultaneously managing other emergencies elsewhere. Consideration of their capacity needs to be remembered.” and “It is not ComCens role to be an agent passing messages. Establishing an early operational communications plan would avoid this.”

  • Safety, Health, and Wellbeing:
  • Positive: No significant injuries or accidents.
  • Improvement: Ensure safety officers have the necessary operational knowledge and experience. Appoint safety officers in each sector for larger incidents. “Personnel appointed to the safety officer role(s) should also have the knowledge and experience for the type of incident, so all risks and hazards are identified.”

  • Incident Ground Management:
  • Positive: First arriving officers focused on water supplies, helicopters, and greater alarms. Comprehensive size-up and accurate SitReps.
  • Improvement: Establish an effective IMT in a single location close to the incident to improve communication between the IMT and the RCC. “The review team believe establishing an effective IMT in a single location close to the incident would have improved communication between the IMT and the RCC.” Consider a deployable resource of proficient Fire Mapper operators within districts.

  • Inter-agency and stakeholder relationships:
  • Positive: Strong inter-agency relationships in Canterbury.
  • Improvement: A common operating picture would be a significant improvement to ensure all agencies are working with the correct and most up to date intelligence.

  • Public Information Management (PIM):
  • Positive: Intensive PIM operation with positive sentiment from the community and stakeholders.
  • Improvement: Develop triggers for deploying PIM immediately to incidents meeting specific criteria. Improve initial briefing frequency and provide a consistent point of contact for media on the fire ground. “There is no clear trigger to activate the PIM team at the earliest opportunity and it relies on, in this case, a trained persons initiative to activate or otherwise the IC requesting PIM support and they are often too busy to consider this in the initial stages of the incident.” Equip the community hub trailer with a noticeboard for key information.

  • Community Hub:
  • Positive: The trailer proved to be very effective and a great focal point for residents to try to gain information needed.
  • Improvement: Ensure the Community Hub is tightly linked to the IMT and PIM to provide readily available and current information. As the document states: “The community hub needs to be resourced as soon as possible to ensure there is a tight link between the IMT and PIM so the information the community are likely to want is readily available and the most current information.” Staff the hub during the evening or provide a contact phone number.

  • Firefighting Operations:
  • Positive: Quick establishment of operations, extensive use of heavy machinery, and overnight firefighting efforts.
  • Hot spotting information from the remote piloted aircraft systems (RPAS – drones) flights overnight was overlaid on Fire Mapper.

  • Aircraft Management:
  • Positive: Air desk managed aircraft acquisition, and experienced Air Attack Supervisor. Good fatigue management.
  • Improvement: Incorporate fixed-wing aircraft earlier. “The air operations team felt they could have incorporated fixed wing aircraft on day one into circuits for water drops, and felt the early suggestion was not initially picked so this didn’t occur until the second day.” Improve public information about retardant use.

  • Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems – RPAS (Drones):
  • Positive: Drones were used extensively for aerial mapping, thermal mapping, and hotspot identification. The data produced contributed to the total information relied on by the incident controller to assist in the update of their IAP.

  • Finance:
  • The finance function was managed by the Region Coordination Centre, and the total cost of fighting this fire was recorded at just over $3m.

  • Region and National Coordination Centres support to IMT:
  • Improvement: Clarify roles between IMT and RCC responsibilities.

  • Recovery:
  • Positive: Good collaboration between FENZ, Police, Territorial Authorities, and CDEM facilitated a smooth transition to recovery.

7. Conclusion

The 2024 Port Hills fire, while in a similar location to the 2017 fire, was a different event due to being wind-driven rather than fuel-driven. The early and heavy resource deployment, coupled with proactive work leading up to the fire season, contributed to a successful operation. Strong relationships between emergency services, supported by their co-location in the Justice and Emergency Services facility, were also crucial. The Iwi’s role in planting fire-resistant vegetation was a positive step. The review identifies key opportunities for improvement to enhance future operations. As the report concludes: “Finally, all agencies involved had been proactive in learning the lessons identified from the 2017 Port Hills fire… This does not mean there are no lessons be identified to improve future operation. The key ones are listed as opportunities for improvement for management to consider.”